  

IT’S NOW THE
JOHN ROBERTS COURT

I

Erwin Chemerinsky†

N THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE in his seven years as Chief Justice,

John Roberts wrote the majority opinion upholding the key
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
over the dissent of four conservative justices who would have
invalidated the entire statute.1 Prior to this decision, only once in
seven years had Chief Justice Roberts been in the majority in a 5-4
decision joined by the four liberal members of the Court.2 In fact,
rarely had Chief Justice Roberts been other than with the conservative justices when there was an ideological division on the Court.
But three times in the last week of October Term 2011, Roberts
sided with the liberals, twice in casting the deciding vote.3
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Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006) (procedural due process was violated by
the failure to provide adequate notice before a tax sale of property).
In Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012), also discussed below, Chief
Justice Roberts joined the majority opinion of Justice Kennedy, which also was
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Had Chief Justice Roberts
joined the dissenters – Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito – it would have been a
4-4 split and the Ninth Circuit’s decision would have been affirmed by an evenly
divided Court. In United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. ___ (2012), discussed below, Chief Justice Roberts joined the opinion of Justice Kennedy, which was also
joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor; Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred
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This, of course, does not make John Roberts a liberal. No matter
how much his vote to uphold the Affordable Care Act disappointed
conservatives, his overall voting record for seven years is consistently solidly conservative. But it does say that no longer can Chief Justice Roberts be taken for granted as another conservative vote along
with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. For seven years, in virtually
every ideologically divided case, it was Justice Kennedy who played
the role as swing justice. Now Roberts has played that role and in
the most important and dramatic of circumstances.
None of this, of course, is to deprecate the continued crucial
role of Justice Kennedy on the current Court. Once more, he was
more often in the majority than any other justice, 93% of the time,
and more often in the majority in 5-4 and 5-3 decisions than any
other justice (12 of 16).
But perhaps because of there being two possible swing justices
this year as compared to other recent terms, the conservative position prevailed less often this year than in the prior six years of the
Roberts Court. There were key liberal victories, such as the decisions about the health care law, Arizona’s SB 1070, limits on life
sentences without parole for juvenile murderers, and free speech.
But there also were crucial conservative victories in limiting contributions to public employee unions, allowing strip searches of inmates without reasonable suspicion, and many civil rights cases
where the Court made it harder to sue government officials.
It is worth noting that the Court decided only 65 cases after
briefing and oral arguments, the fewest in decades. In each of the
prior two terms, the Court had decided 75 cases after briefing and
oral arguments and as recently as the 1980s the Court was averaging
over 160 cases a term.
In this essay I review the decisions and implications in several key
areas: the Affordable Care Act, Arizona’s immigration law, criminal
procedure, the First Amendment, and civil rights litigation.

in the judgment, while Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented.
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T

PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT

he Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the individual mandate
and most of the Affordable Care Act is now familiar to all. But
what are its likely implications?
There were three parts to the Court’s holding in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.4 First, by a 5-4 margin, the
Court upheld the individual mandate, the centerpiece of the Act.
There are 50 million Americans without health insurance and the
Affordable Care Act seeks to remedy that. A crucial mechanism is to
require that almost all individuals have health insurance and those
that don’t must pay a penalty to the Internal Revenue Service. Insurance companies are required to provide coverage to all and no
longer can deny policies based on preexisting conditions, or charge
higher premiums based on health conditions, or impose yearly or
lifetime caps on payments.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, said that the individual mandate is a tax and
within the scope of Congress’s taxing power. He explained that the
mandate is calculated like a tax; for example, in 2014, it is one percent of income or $95 for those who do not purchase insurance. It is
collected by the Internal Revenue Service and the funds go to the
federal treasury; it will generate about $4 billion in 2014. The
Court said that it was irrelevant that the Obama administration never called it a tax; the labels used by the government are not determinative.
This does not change the law in any way in terms of the scope of
Congress’s taxing and spending power or how it is determined if
something is a tax. At most, it is a reminder that if Congress wants
to discourage behavior, it has the power to tax it.
Second, five justices – Chief Justice Roberts and the four dissenters (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) – said that the
individual mandate was not a constitutional exercise of Congress’s
4
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commerce clause power. They said that Congress under the commerce clause may regulate economic activity that taken cumulatively has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. They saw the individual mandate as regulating inactivity, regulating those not engaged in commerce, and thus exceeding the scope of Congress’s
power.
I think that this is fundamentally misguided because all are engaged in economic activity with regard to health care; as Justice
Ginsburg pointed out, over 99% of people will receive medical care
in their lifetimes and 60% of the uninsured do so each year. Everyone is engaged in economic activity in that they are either purchasing insurance or self-insuring; Congress is regulating the latter economic behavior.
The five justices have created a new distinction limiting Congress’s commerce power: it can regulate activity, not inactivity.
How much will this matter? Perhaps little in that Congress rarely is
going to compel economic transactions. On the other hand, any distinctions like “activity/inactivity” or “direct/indirect”5 are an open
invitation to litigation where a great deal turns on labels and characterizations.
Consider an example: Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
which was adopted under Congress’s commerce clause power, prohibits hotels and restaurants from discriminating on the basis of
race.6 Does that law regulate the “inactivity” of hotels and restaurants that refused to serve African-Americans, or was it regulating
“activity”? I am not suggesting that the Court will strike down Title
II, but it does illustrate how much can turn on a label.
Finally, the Court in a 7-2 ruling held that it exceeded the scope
of Congress’s spending power and violated the Tenth Amendment
for the Act to deny all Medicaid funding to states that do not comply
with the new conditions for Medicaid. The Act requires that states
cover within their Medicaid programs those within 133% of the
5

6
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federal poverty level. The federal government pays 100% of these
costs until 2019 and 90% thereafter. Any state that failed to comply
would lose all of its Medicaid funds.
The Court said that it was unduly coercive to tie existing Medicaid funds to a failure to comply with a new requirement. The
Court saw two Medicaid programs, the old one and the new requirements, and said that it was impermissible to tie existing funds
to the failure to comply with new requirements. But why see this as
two programs rather than one? Moreover, why see this as Congress’
coercing – or to use Chief Justice Roberts’ word, “dragooning” –
the states? Admittedly, given the huge amount of money involved,
any state would face a hard choice to turn it down. But there is a
basic difference between being forced to do something and facing a
very difficult choice.
It is this part of the opinion that is likely to have the broadest implications. This is the first time that the Court ever has found conditions on federal funds to be so coercive as to be unconstitutional.
Countless federal statutes provide funds to state and local governments on the condition that they comply with requirements. There
likely will be challenges to many of these laws on the ground that
the requirements are too coercive.
For example, the federal Solomon Amendment provides that if
any law school refuses to allow the military to recruit on campus, its
university will lose all federal funds. Similarly, federal law provides
that if a university program discriminates based on race, the entire
university and not just that program will lose its federal funding.
Many federal environmental laws operate through conditions on
state and local governments receiving money. The Court gave little
guidance as to how to decide when conditions are too coercive and
that will lead to a great deal of litigation.

A

IMMIGRATION

rizona’s SB 1070 declares its purpose to be decreasing the
presence in the state of undocumented immigrants through
aggressive law enforcement and attrition. In 2010, federal district
court judge Susan Bolton issued a preliminary injunction against
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four key provisions of SB 1070.7 In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court in a 5-3 ruling affirmed almost all of Judge Bolton’s
preliminary injunction.8 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority and
was joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice
Kagan was recused.
Justice Kennedy began by accepting the argument of the United
States that immigration is solely in the control of the federal government. Anything done with regard to immigration has foreign
policy implications and states cannot have their own foreign policy.
The Court quoted its 1942 ruling in Hines v. Davidowitz, that states
cannot “contradict or complement” federal immigration efforts.9
The Court affirmed three parts of Judge Bolton’s preliminary injunction, finding unconstitutional as preempted by federal law the
provisions of SB 1070 that require non-citizens to carry papers at all
times showing that they are lawfully in the country, that prohibit
those not lawfully in the country from seeking or receiving employment in Arizona, and that allow police to arrest individuals
without warrants when there is probable cause that they are deportable.
The Court reversed the preliminary injunction as to the provision which allows police to question individuals about their immigration status if they are stopped for other reasons and if there is
reasonable suspicion that they are not lawfully in the United States.
Even this provision was substantially narrowed as the Court held
that police cannot extend the duration of a stop to check immigration status and also that state and local police cannot arrest individuals who they determine to be illegally in the country. Moreover, the
Court left open the possibility of an “as applied” challenge to this
provision of SB 1070 if it could be shown that it was being applied in
a racially discriminatory fashion.
The decision is a clear message to state governments that laws
like SB 1070 are unconstitutional because they intrude on the feder7
8
9

United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp.2d 980 (D.Ariz. 2010).
132 S.Ct. ___ (2012).
312 U.S. 41 (1942).
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al government’s exclusive power to control immigration. The one
part of the preliminary injunction reversed by the Supreme Court
has potentially very troubling implications. Realistically, it seems
inevitable that police will decide who to question about immigration
status based on surname and skin color. But that challenge, which
was expressly left open by Justice Kennedy’s opinion, will need to
wait until another case.

F

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

rom a practical perspective, the decisions that will most affect
the practice of law and what judges do on a daily basis are Missouri v. Frye10 and Lafler v. Cooper.11 In two 5-4 decisions, with Justice
Kennedy writing for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, the Court held that the right to effective assistance of counsel applies at the plea bargaining stage. Justice Kennedy explained
that plea bargaining is a critical stage of criminal proceedings: 97%
of all convictions in federal court and 94% of all convictions in state
court are gained via guilty pleas.
The Court said that the two-part test for ineffective assistance of
counsel articulated in Strickland v. Washington is to be applied.12
First, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
so deficient as to negate representation. Second, the defendant must
show prejudice. The Court said that this requires that the defendant
show that he or she likely would have accepted the plea bargain, that
the prosecutor likely would not have withdrawn it, and that the
judge likely would have allowed the plea agreement.
The decisions likely will change how plea bargaining is done in
many jurisdictions, causing it to be more formal and put in writing.
Also, it already is leading to a large number of individuals arguing
that their pleas were the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The difficult inquiry for the courts will be how to assess prejudice.
For example, how are they to assess whether the judge would have
allowed the plea?
10

132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012).
132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012).
12
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It is important to note that Lafler v. Cooper was before the Court
on a writ of habeas corpus. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal
court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court decision is “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established law as announced by the Supreme Court. The fact that the
Supreme Court found this standard to be met means that it did not
regard its decision as creating new law. Thus, it seems clear that
these decisions will apply retroactively and open the door to a large
number of claims by people who pled guilty, but believe that there
was ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Miller v. Alabama,13 the Court held that a mandatory sentence
of life imprisonment without parole for a homicide committed by a
juvenile is cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Kagan wrote for
the majority and was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor. The Court did not create an absolute bar to such a
punishment, but said that there must be an individual determination
that justifies such a sentence, which the Court indicated should be
rare. This is different from Roper v. Simmons,14 which held that there
never can be the death penalty for a crime committed by a juvenile,
or Graham v. Florida,15 which held that there never can be a sentence
of life without parole for a non-homicide crime committed by a juvenile.
This likely will have the practical consequence of requiring a
penalty phase when a prosecutor wants a sentence of life without
parole for a homicide committed by a juvenile. The jury will need
to find the aggravating factors that warrant such a penalty. There is
likely to be immediate litigation over whether this applies retroactively. In saying that a punishment is unconstitutional, Miller v. Alabama would seem to apply retroactively. On the other hand, if it is
seen as imposing a new procedural requirement – a penalty phase
hearing before a juvenile can be sentenced to life without parole for
homicide crimes – this would not be retroactive.
13
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There were two Fourth Amendment decisions. I long have
thought that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions can
be explained by a simple predictive principle: if the justices can imagine it happening to them, then it violates the Fourth Amendment.
That certainly explains both of this year’s Fourth Amendment rulings.
In United States v. Jones,16 the Court held that it violated the
Fourth Amendment for the police to place a GPS device on a person’s car and track his movements for 28 days without a valid warrant. Although the result was unanimous, the justices differed in
their reasoning. Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Roberts,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, pointed to a 1765 English decision, Entick v. Carrington, which would have treated the placing of
the GPS device as a trespass, thus making it a search for modern
Fourth Amendment purposes. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by the other justices in which he argued that it makes no sense to decide what is a search in 2012 by
looking to 18th-century English decisions. He said that the focus
should be on whether there is an invasion of the reasonable expectation of privacy.
But neither of these approaches is likely to be very useful when
courts confront, as they inevitably will, the question of when the
use of satellites and drones to gather information violates the Fourth
Amendment. Surely 18th-century English law will not be helpful
with this. Nor, though, will Justice Alito’s approach be helpful. We
have no reasonable expectation of privacy when we are on public
streets; the police could have had an undercover agent follow Jones
every minute he was outside and never needed a warrant. What is
needed, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her concurring opinion, is a new approach for deciding when people have the Fourth
Amendment right to keep information from the government unless
it has a valid warrant.
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,17 the Court ruled, 5-4,
16
17

132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
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that jails may subject inmates to strip searches without any need for
reasonable suspicion. Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, said that the interest of jails in ensuring security and preventing drugs and weapons from being smuggled in was sufficient to permit strip searches without any need for
reasonable suspicion. It is a case which reflects the tremendous deference of the conservative majority to claims by jails and prisons of
the need to restrict the rights of inmates.

I

FIRST AMENDMENT

n Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,18
the Court held that it violates both the free exercise and the establishment clauses of the First Amendment to hold a religious institution liable for choices it makes as to who will be its ministers. The
case involved a teacher at a parochial elementary school who took a
leave of absence because of a serious illness. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission sued on her behalf when the school filled
her position when she was ill and then fired her when the school
thought she might be contemplating an action under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous Court, said that
the teacher was deemed a “minister” by the school, having taken the
requisite courses at a religious college and been approved by the
board of the school for this designation. The Court said that it
would be unconstitutional to hold the school liable under employment discrimination law for the choices it makes as to who will be
its ministers.
What, then, if a religious institution designates all of its employees to be ministers? It would seemingly then be exempt from all
employment discrimination laws. In fact, this is the first time the
Supreme Court ever has found a First Amendment exemption for
religious institutions from the application of civil rights statutes. It
undoubtedly will open the door to many more such challenges in
the future.
18

132 S.Ct. 694 (2012).
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There were two important speech cases. In United States v. Alvarez,19 the Court declared unconstitutional the federal Stolen Valor
Act, which makes it a crime for a person to falsely claim to have
received a military honor or declaration. Justice Kennedy wrote for
a plurality of four and concluded that the law imposed a contentbased restriction on speech and thus had to meet the most exacting
scrutiny. He explained that the government failed this test because
it did not prove any harm from false claims of military honors and
because the government could achieve its goals through less restrictive alternatives. Perhaps most importantly for the future, he rejected the government’s argument that false speech is inherently outside
the scope of the First Amendment.
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan. He said that he would use intermediate rather than strict scrutiny and that the law failed this test because it was not narrowly tailored. He suggested that a narrower statute, one that prohibits false
claims of military honors with the goal of receiving a tangible benefit, likely would be constitutional. Congress may well adopt exactly
that type of law.
The other major speech case was Knox v. SEIU.20 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,21 the Court held that public employees cannot be forced to join a union, but they must pay for the collective
bargaining activities of the union since they benefit from them. They
cannot, however, be required to support the political activities of
the union. In subsequent cases, the Court made clear that those who
do not want to support the political activities can “opt out” of doing
so and must be given an accounting as to the percentage of dues that
are used for collective bargaining as opposed to political activities.
In Knox, Justice Alito, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, held that at least as to special assessments for political
campaigns, non-members must not be assessed unless they “opt in”
and affirmatively choose to give support, as opposed to being as19

132 S.Ct. ___ (2012).
132 S.Ct. ___ (2012).
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431 U.S. 209 (1977).
20
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sessed unless they opt out. As was pointed out by Justices Sotomayor and Breyer, in separate opinions, this is a major change in
the law and there is no reason this will be limited to special assessments.
Justice Alito’s reasoning will seemingly require non-members
always to be subject to an opt-in system and make the long-standing
opt-out system unconstitutional. This will significantly decrease the
funds for public employee unions to participate in the political process. It is ironic that the same Supreme Court that so strengthened
the political power of corporations in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission22 has significantly decreased the political strength of
unions.

T

CIVIL RIGHTS

he plaintiffs lost in every civil rights case where they were seeking money damages. For example, in Minecci v. Pollard,23 the
Supreme Court held that prison guards at private prisons contracting with the federal government cannot be sued for constitutional
violations where state tort law provides a remedy. The Court said
that no Bivens claim could be brought by a prisoner who suffered
physical injuries and claimed an Eighth Amendment violation because state tort law provided some remedy, even though not the
same as would be available in a Bivens action.24 Justice Breyer writing for the Court, with only Justice Ginsburg dissenting, stated:
Where, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages from privately employed personnel working at a privately operated federal
prison, where the conduct allegedly amounts to a violation of
the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct is of a kind
that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort law
(such as the conduct involving improper medical care at issue
here), the prisoner must seek a remedy under state tort law.
We cannot imply a Bivens remedy in such a case.25
22

130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
132 S.Ct. 617 (2012).
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Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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132 S.Ct. at 626.
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Private prisons operating under contracts with the government
are increasingly common and this will make it much more difficult
for prisoners in facilities contracting with the federal government to
sue. But the Court’s reasoning suggests an even greater significance
to the case: for the first time, the Court has said that the existence
of state remedies can preclude a Bivens cause of action. In a number
of cases, the Court had said that the existence of a federal statutory
remedy could preclude Bivens actions. But in Bivens itself the Court
had rejected the argument that a state tort remedy was a reason to
deny a federal cause of action for a constitutional violation.
In Ryburn v. Huff,26 the Court held that police officials were protected by qualified immunity when they entered a home without a
warrant and without the permission of the occupants. Government
officials who are sued for money damages for constitutional violations, whether state and local officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
federal officers in a Bivens action, may assert immunity as a defense.
A few officers – such as prosecutors performing prosecutorial actions, judges performing judicial actions, and legislators performing
legislative actions – have absolute immunity to suits for money damages. All other officers have qualified immunity and may be held
liable for their discretionary acts only if they violate clearly established law that a reasonable officer should know.
The courts have long struggled with how to determine what is
clearly established law that the reasonable officer should know. In
Hope v. Pelzer,27 the Court held that there does not need to be a case
on point in order to overcome qualified immunity. Hope v. Pelzer
involved prison guards who tied a prisoner to a hitching post and
left him in the hot sun for seven hours with almost no water and no
access to a bathroom. The federal court of appeals ruled that the
prison guards had engaged in cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, but held that the guards were protected by qualified immunity because there was no case on point
holding that this was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed
26
27

132 S.Ct. 987 (2012).
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and expressly held that a case on point is not necessary so long as
officers have “fair warning” that their conduct is unconstitutional.
Otherwise, of course, egregious unconstitutional actions would be
shielded from liability if they had not been done before and thus had
not been specifically disapproved by the courts.
However, in recent cases, without acknowledging it was doing
so, the Court has backed away from Hope v. Pelzer and found qualified immunity because there was not a specific case on point. For
example, in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd,28 the Court held that the Attorney
General was protected by qualified immunity for authorizing a person to be held on a material witness warrant even though there never had been any desire to use the person as a material witness and
there was no suspicion that the person had committed any crime.
Similarly, in the recent ruling in Ryburn v. Huff, the Court found
qualified immunity based on the absence of a case on point.29 A rumor circulated in a high school that a student there had threatened
violence. The police went to the boy’s home to investigate. The boy
and his mother came out of the house and answered the police questions. The officer asked permission to enter the home and the mother refused. When the mother entered the home, the police officer
followed without permission and against her wishes. The officer said
that his experience was that parents usually allow officers in their
home when asked for consent. The police found no weapons or other contraband and ultimately concluded that the rumors about the
boy were unfounded.
The Ninth Circuit rejected qualified immunity. The Supreme
Court, in a per curium opinion, reversed. Once more, the Court
stressed the absence of decisions on point and said: “No decision of
this Court has found a Fourth Amendment violation on facts even
roughly comparable to those present in this case.”30 The Court said
that its precedents had allowed police to enter a home when there
was a fear of violence. But those decisions had allowed police to
28

131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011).
132 S.Ct. 987 (2012).
30
132 S.Ct. at 990.
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enter when there was reason to believe that there might be violence
in the home; here it was a only a rumor and there was no basis for
suspicion other than the occupant of the home not wanting the police to enter.
The Court, of course, has not overruled Hope v. Pelzer. But it is
notable that in neither of these cases was it cited; nor did the Court
focus on what should be the central inquiry under Hope v. Pelzer: did
the officer have fair notice that the conduct violated the Constitution? Requiring that the plaintiff have a case on point to overcome
qualified immunity will create an obstacle for civil rights plaintiffs in
many cases.

A

NEXT YEAR

lready on the docket for next year is the issue of whether colleges and universities may continue to use race as a factor in
admissions decisions to benefit minorities (Fisher v. University of Texas, Austin).31 Also, the Court will decide whether companies can be
sued in the United States for their foreign human rights violations
under the Alien Tort Statute (Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum).32 And it
seems highly likely that the Court will decide whether there is a
constitutional right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians. It is
an amazing couple of years in the Supreme Court.

31
32

Cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1656 (2012).
Set for rehearing and reargument, 132 S.Ct. 1738 (2012).
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